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Abstract 
This paper answers an important question consensually identified as crucial for smart grid roll-out. Our objective 
is to highlight the reasons for economic, technological and regulatory uncertainty continuing in the smart grid 
sector. The argument of this paper is that to face uncertainty, actors adopted strategic positioning but not sys-
tematically favoring the emergence of a structuring and shared vision of smart grid. However, converging visions 
are necessary to limit uncertainty and thus secure the sector’s development and durability in the coming years.  
The results presented here are based on two methodological approaches. First, a social network analysis of 
worldwide relationships between smart grid actors has been performed to characterize the actors’ positioning 
strategies. The paper identifies four categories of actors: local observers, global observers, experimenters, and 
central actors. Second, a qualitative analysis of semi-structured interviews with approximately 30 French smart 
grid stakeholders gave us information on discourses and perceptions of the sector’s reality and constraints. It 
appeared that smart grid merges both long-established actors in the smart grid focal sector, i.e., energy, promot-
ing a highly accurate but strictly energy-oriented perception, and new entrants coming from related sectors such 
as ICT, offering an open but indistinct perspective. Therefore, stakeholders diverge on the definition and poten-
tial source of added value. These results help to elucidate the transition of socio-technical systems. Indeed, at 
this very moment when contextual uncertainty remains high, it appears that actors from the focal sector play a 
crucial part in driving the current sector development, whereas new entrants remain unable to modify the sec-
tor’s regime decisively. One can interpret this situation as a sign of the failure of the smart grid sector to emerge 
as such. Conversely, one can see here an evolution of focal actors’ strategies regarding uncertainty in an innova-
tive socio-technical system in transition. To solve this issue, further studies should be conducted both on the 
smart grid sector to see how it will evolve and on other sectors to search for similar trends. 
Keywords: Smart grid, Social network analysis, Strategic positioning, Uncertainty, Socio-technical system transition 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper answers a crucial issue for smart grid roll-
out, which is the reasons for continuing uncertainty 
in the sector. Indeed, uncertainty of various types 
(e.g., economic, technological, and regulatory) has 
been clearly identified in recent literature (Section 
2) but has not yet been directly investigated. This 
article proposes to fill this research gap, showing 
that uncertainty mainly continues because of the in-
ability of smart grid actors to favor the emergence 
of a structuring and shared vision of the sector. 
However, structuring and sharing such a vision for 
smart grid is necessary to limit uncertainty and thus 
secure the sector’s development and durability in 
the coming years. 
Based on insights from sociology and innovation 
studies, this paper offers an analysis of the smart 
grid sector conceptualized as a socio-technical sys-
tem. We rely on an original methodology that com-
bines two approaches for studying actors’ coopera-
tion strategies (Section 3). First, a social network 
analysis exploiting an original database gathering 
worldwide partnerships in smart grid projects has 
been performed to characterize actors’ positioning 
strategies at the systemic level. Second, a qualita-
tive analysis of semi-structured interviews with ap-
proximately 30 French smart grid stakeholders in-
formed us on the discourses and perceptions on the 
reality and constraints of the smart grid sector.  
This empirical material allows us to investigate the 
hindrance to the transformative capacity of the 
 2 
 
sector standing at the inter-section of the actors’ 
strategies and the smart grid socio-technical sys-
tem. On this basis, the paper has two main out-
comes (Section 4) that contribute to understanding 
and explaining how smart grid stakeholders have 
been reacting and positioning themselves in a com-
plex and uncertain environment. First, we identified 
four categories of actors regarding their positioning 
strategies. Second, we demonstrated the im-
portance of the heterogeneous nature of stakehold-
ers to explain the discourse’s oscillation between 
enthusiasm and reluctance regarding the potential-
ities of smart grid technology.  
In the conclusion (Section 5), we argue that in a con-
text of toughened competition and considering the 
positioning strategies previously highlighted, it ap-
pears that stakeholders are unable to build a shared 
vision, which prevents the smart grid sector from 
lowering uncertainty, which would allow prospec-
tive achievements. We also briefly open a discus-
sion on the possible renewal of actors’ strategies in-
volved in innovative socio-technical systems in tran-
sition. 
 
2. Literature review 
Because the recent spreading of awareness that the 
Earth resources are finite, especially regarding in-
creasing energy scarcity, a dilemma has emerged: 
how to handle the increase of electricity demand 
and consumption peaks in a context of energy sup-
ply deficit. One possible answer (mostly relevant in 
Europe) would be to increase energy production 
through the integration of renewable energies. An-
other solution (especially in North America) would 
be to avoid grid malfunctions (mostly during con-
sumption peaks) and the high costs of the associ-
ated blackouts, by renewing aging grids. By seeking 
solutions to the tricky equation of matching electric-
ity supply and demand, it has appeared that smart 
grid is a possible and realistic option [41, 60]. Thus, 
for 10 years, real enthusiasm for smart grid has 
emerged all around the world—perceptible through 
the high number of dedicated publications, reports, 
strategic displays, and R&D projects—mainly con-
veyed by related industries, public administrations 
and politicians, all awaiting economic and environ-
mental profits [50, 63]. 
In this context, smart grid is expected to fulfill a set of 
specific functions, identified in the literature as being 
able to solve energy challenges (see among many 
others [1–4]), such as: (1) the efficient management 
of supply, including intermittent supply; (2)two-way 
communication between the producer and user of 
electricity; (3) the use of information and communi-
cation technology(ICT) to respond to and manage de-
mand; and (4) the insurance of safe and secure elec-
tricity distribution. Doing so should turn a “dumb” 
electrical grid into a “smart” one [4, 31].  
Considering the high potential of smart grid for solv-
ing energy issues, we can legitimately wonder why it 
has not been massively implemented yet. The litera-
ture investigating this issue first notes that no con-
sensual definition of smart grid has emerged yet (for 
a complete and synthetic review of the literature, see 
Ref. [40], which propose four types of smart grid def-
initions reflecting the absence of consensus: (1) “via 
requirements”, (2) “via applied technologies”,(3) “via 
desired applications” and (4) “no clear definition”). It 
is thus difficult to know precisely what one means 
when talking about smart grid. The roots of the het-
erogeneity of smart grid definitions have to be 
grounded in the geographical, economic and histori-
cal specificities of national electrical grids [4, 6]. In-
deed, national specificities (such as national energy 
mix, industrial policies, polity and corporate govern-
ance structure) have long favored the scattering of 
technological expertise into separate locations. This 
results in preventing the current homogenization of 
the smart grid concept [13, 41, 50]. As a result, it ap-
pears that smart grid deployment cannot be homo-
geneous worldwide because it is more likely to de-
pend on the technical characteristics and specific 
structure of each electrical grid: the more decentral-
ized an electrical grid is, the higher smart grid perva-
sion will need to be [47]. 
Thus, considering the lack of a shared definition re-
lated to the variety of expected achievements and 
local constraints, smart grid implementation cur-
rently faces major challenges that are considered in 
literature alternatively as barriers (see Fig. 1 in [2] 
and [5]) or incentives [18, 34, 54]. 
The first challenge is to remove uncertainty regard-
ing the cost of smart grid, as many recent reports 
have noted its increasing deployment costs. Hence, 
some countries have questioned and even jeopard-
ized smart grid implementation. For instance, de-
spite the European directive on the electricity mar-
ket [20], Belgium decided not to systematically de-
ploy smart meters (considered the first step of 
smart grid) because the cost/benefit analysis was 
not positive. Following the upwards revision of 
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smart grid costs, analysts have observed that mar-
ket uncertainty concerning the smart grid’s future 
evolutions has significantly grown [18, 34, 39], 
mainly concerning the opportunity to invest in such 
an uncertain technology [7, 47, 60].  
Indeed, the reassessment of smart grid deployment 
costs is unanimously related to the literature on tech-
nical uncertainty. First, technical uncertainty has an 
impact on the possible developments of the energy 
system in its complexity, accentuated by the require-
ments for integrating intermittent and decentralized 
power sources [8, 21–23, 34, 51]. Second, technical 
uncertainty also stems from the lack of (1) technol-
ogy maturity [46, 61, 62]; (2) necessary technical skills 
and knowledge [47]; (3) open standards and ad-
vanced bidirectional communication systems [4, 18, 
34, 39, 53];and (4) real reflections about cyber secu-
rity and data privacy issues[36, 39, 46, 60, 63]. 
When considering the rising costs and technical un-
certainty of smart grid, most scholars wonder about 
the existence of a reliable business model for smart 
grid deployment when no stabilized technical solu-
tion currently exists [14, 22,29, 42, 61, 62]. At pre-
sent, no clear answer prevails. If cost/benefit anal-
yses have all agreed on a deficit gap between smart 
grid investment costs and created value; scholars 
are basically dividing into two categories: those 
wondering if a business model exists at all and those 
proposing alternatives to balance the smart grid 
business model.  
In this second perspective, a first option for com-
pensating the demand–response investments and 
supporting programs is a more accurate valuation of 
avoided costs thanks to smart grid in electricity gen-
eration, transmission, and distribution [3, 33]. To 
find an equilibrium, some also argue that smart grid 
assessment ignores or underestimates added value 
induced by smart grid, for example, in the urban di-
mension and in city governance [31]. From these 
perspectives, the smart grid definition border tends 
to enlarge and thus involves issues, going beyond 
energy-grid concerns.  
A second option to counterbalance the cost-benefit 
gap consists of focusing on value added for the en-
ergy market. For example, this counterbalancing 
could involve the introduction of dynamic tariffs dur-
ing peak demand. It would provide economic incen-
tives for end users to adapt their consumption to the 
energy supply: demand would be compliant with 
supply. This would require that end users benefit 
from adapting their consumption. From this 
perspective, smart grid actors should agree to pay for 
demand-side management, i.e., to share part of the 
value with end users. For instance, utility companies 
and distribution network operator companies could 
reward end users by offering dynamic tariffs, direct 
payments or the availability payments for a con-
sumption change at an agreed time, for electricity 
not consumed, for greenhouse gasses not emitted, or 
for reducing the energy generation security margin, 
avoiding the building cost of new generation plants 
[15]. However, even so, it seems difficult so far to in-
volve end users because the technological and eco-
nomic aspects of smart grid remain quite complex 
and thus abstruse: people do not perceive what ben-
efits smart grid could provide in their daily life or from 
an economical point of view. To overcome this diffi-
culty, more and more smart grid demonstration pro-
jects are working with end users who provide feed-
back on their perception of energy and their behav-
iors [25, 34]. First, outcomes have confirmed the the-
oretical hypothesis of inequity in demand–response 
management [22], showing, for instance, that peak 
pricing is perceived negatively and would primarily 
impact households with limited financial means [48]. 
Furthermore it appears that feedback devices as they 
are currently designed have limited influence on 
household energy consumption [52, 56]. These initial 
results highlight the challenge for smart grid actors to 
involve end users through the currently existing de-
mand–response management mechanisms. Further-
more, it reinforces the smart grid actors’ appetence 
for finding alternative valuable options to demon-
strate the strength and reliability of smart grid busi-
ness models.  
The third lever of endorsement for smart grid identi-
fied in the literature concerns the possible evolution 
of regulatory measures to build an efficient business 
model that captures the value of new business mod-
els and platforms [12, 30]. However, considerations 
about regulation are ambiguous. On the one hand, 
the lack of a regulatory framework appears as a prob-
lem [53] resulting from technical complexity: similar 
to end users, regulators face difficulty understanding 
smart grid technical issues, which lowers public 
awareness and engagement [36, 39]. On the other 
hand, incentive regulation seems to hinder innova-
tion while not guaran-teeing data security [47]. This 
suggests that smart grid deployment requires exten-
sive industry-regulator collaboration to structure a 
regulatory framework adapted to the specificities of 
smart grid. However, cooperation is difficult: institu-
tional mechanisms are slowly changing and 
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technology providers are struggling to adapt their or-
ganizational structure to the smart grid market [47]. 
Nevertheless, public authorities have an important 
part to play not only regarding regulation but also 
through the implementation of innovation policies, 
following the example of the USA [36], China [38], Ja-
pan [43] and the EU [50]. 
This literature review shows that, for a few years, 
the complex and uncertain environment currently 
characterizing smart grid has been well known and 
precisely analyzed. It also shows that scarce expla-
nations were produced to explain why uncertainty 
does not seem to be decreasing. Hence, this paper 
proposes to look for reasons underlying the contin-
uing uncertainty in cooperation strategies imple-
mented by smart grid actors. Based on insights from 
sociology and innovation studies, this paper offers a 
strategic networking analysis of the smart grid sec-
tor that is conceptualized as a socio-technical sys-
tem [26, 27, 44, 59], which means it includes actors 
such as firms, research institutes, users or policy-
makers, institutional structures and specific tech-
nologies, all involved in social interactions. To avoid 
the trend of systemic approaches that focus on 
meso-level of sectoral transitions [2, 16, 17, 28], this 
paper relies on an original methodology that allows 
us to investigate the hindrance to the transforma-
tive capacity of the sector standing at the border be-
tween the micro-level of actors’ strategies and 
theme so-level of the smart grid socio-technical sys-
tem. This paper has been inspired both by ap-
proaches developed in economic sociology on per-
formativity [9, 10, 40] and in the social studies on 
the influence of technologies on expectations, ideas 
[5, 37, 55] and networks [45]. Hence, it highlights 
how crucial it has become to understand and ex-
plain how smart grid actors have been reacting and 
positioning themselves towards systemic uncer-
tainty and how they are influencing the possible so-
cio-technical evolutions of the smart grid sector. 
 
3. Methods 
This article relies on cross-checking quantitative and 
qualitative methodological approaches. First, a net-
work analysis allows us to describe the objectivized 
structure of cooperation in the smart grid ecosys-
tem. Then, a discourse analysis based on data col-
lected through semi-structured interviews with 
                                                          
1 Since then, the updated versions of these databases are much 
more exhaustive (see, for example, Ref. [30]). 
French smart grid actors makes it possible to qualify 
and understand the strategic nature of cooperation 
relationships highlighted by network analysis. The 
converging results from these two methodological 
tools thus provide renewed and strengthened in-
sight into smart grid actors ’strategies. 
 
3.1. Semi-quantitative methodology: social net-
work analysis 
Social network analysis studies the structure of re-
lationships (referred to as partnership within the 
framework of R&D projects) between social entities 
(referred to as smart grid actors). This methodolog-
ical approach characterizes networked structures in 
terms of nodes and the ties or edges that connect 
them. Network analysis is a tool processing data-
base—often operated by software—to provide in-
formation both on network structure (prioritization, 
density, etc.) and on nodes’ position and relational 
characteristics (centrality, positioning singularity re-
garding other nodes, etc.). Furthermore, social net-
work analysis can be usefully enriched by graphic 
representations illustrating structural results.  
The network analysis presented in this paper relies 
on an original database. At the time this work began 
in 2011, scarce information was available on smart 
grid. When searching for data, it appeared that, for 
example, the Joint Research Center’s (JRC)database, 
listing smart grid projects in Europe, was far from 
exhaustive, as many French projects were not in-
cluded. In the same way, data available on Open EI 
(Open data on Energy Information) and from the US 
Department of Energy (DoE) on smart grid projects, 
worldwide and in the US, were incomplete1.Further-
more, even if the development of these (partial) 
lists of smart grid projects was in progress, none of 
them had gathered data on participants. This means 
that actors’ partnerships were not and still are not 
analyzed as such.  
Because the ambition was to study actors’ coopera-
tion strategy through network analysis, we decided 
to build an original database focused on actors, 
gathering the list of partners involved in ongoing 
worldwide projects stamped “smart grid” until May 
2013. These projects were first identified in JRC’s, 
Open EI’s and DoE’s databases available in 2012, 
and then supplemented with 59 non-inventoried 
projects found via documentary research on the 
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Internet2.For each project, we searched for partici-
pants’ names and geographical locations. Our origi-
nal database ultimately inventoried 460 projects, 
but the partner lists had been completed for only 
399 projects. To make actors’ partnership strategy 
visible, i.e., to limit actors’ dispersal between sub-
sidiaries, we aggregated organizations affiliated 
with the same entity when it was pertinent. For ex-
ample, aggregating Edelia with EDF seemed perti-
nent, whereas RTE and ERDF were listed on their 
own even if they are also 100% affiliated to EDF.  
 
Box 1: How to read the network maps? 
Node location 
NetDraw’s algorithm for node location uses iterative 
fitting (i.e. starts with a random graph, measures rele-
vance of fit; moves a node, measures relevance; and if 
it is better, keeps going in that direction...) to locate the 
points in such a way as to put those with the smallest 
path lengths as close to one another as possible in the 
graph. The optional “node repulsion” criterion has 
been selected. It created separation between objects 
that would otherwise be located very close to one an-
other. We have also used the optional criterion of seek-
ing to make the paths of “equal edge length” so that 
the distances between adjacent objects are similar. The 
result is a graph that preserves many of the features of 
the dimensional scaling approach (distances are still 
somewhat interpretable), but where it is usually easier 
to read – particularly if it matters – specific nodes’ lo-
cation and relational environment (rather than seeing 
node types of clusters). 
Node attributes 
A node represents an actor. The data available to char-
acterize a node concern participation in one or several 
projects, number of partners, relationship intensity, 
the geographic influence of smart grid projects, and 
presence in Europe for the world database or in France 
for the French database. For geographical location, 
each project has been characterized according to the 
geographical area where it took place. When a project 
took place in several countries, aggregated areas were 
used (see column “Aggregated Areas” in Table 1). Then, 
actors have been “located” according to the area(s) of 
the project(s) they were involved in. When an actor was 
involved in several projects, it was characterized by the 
aggregated areas used for the projects, to which a 
“World” category was added for actors involved in at 
least two different aggregated areas. 
Tie-strength 
Tie-strength reflects the number of cooperation links 
between two nodes. The ratio between the weakest tie 
(1 link) and the strongest (7 links) is 1–10. Furthermore, 
an indicator was created to distinguish, among world-
wide actors, those involved in Europe. 
                                                          
2 2The Internet search induces two main biases: (1) linguistic lim-
itation (we were unable to include projects only referenced in 
languages other than English, French, Spanish or German); and 
(2) the perimeter of digital resources (only the data avail-able on 
Nodes’ colors and shapes correspond to cooperation 
categories built on the basis of actors’ objectified struc-
tural positioning resulting from network analysis (see 
Section 4.1,p. 5).For each graph, node size reflects the 
node’s centrality degree[24], which is defined as the 
number of link incidents upon a node (i.e., the number 
of ties that a node has). The degree can be interpreted 
in terms of the immediate risk of a node catching what-
ever is flowing through the network (such as a virus, or 
some information): the bigger a node is, the higher the 
centrality degree of the actor. In the following graphs, 
the ratio between nodes with the lowest and the high-
est centrality degree is 1–5. 
 
Table 1  
Geographical locations.  
Aggregated area 
associated with 
the actor 
Project locations 
Middle East Abu Dhabi, Mediterranean Union, 
Lebanon 
Asia South Korea, Japan, India, Singapore 
Oceania Australia, New Zealand 
North America USA, Canada 
Europe Germany, Austria, Belgium, Den-
mark, Spain, Finland, Italy, France, 
Norway, Baltic Countries, Nordic 
Countries, the Netherlands, Swe-
den, Switzerland 
South America Brazil, Mexico 
Africa Senegal 
World At least 2 aggregated geographical 
areas 
Source: <http://faculty.ucr.edu/∼hanneman/nettext/C4 
netdraw.html#relations> [consulted 12.04.2014]. 
Based on this, the article provides a network map-
ping of the partnership of smart grid actors, first 
worldwide (399 projects involving 1598 actors), and 
second, at the French scale (354 actors involved in 
70 projects including at least one French organiza-
tion). The network analysis, performed with Ucinet 
and NetDraw software programs (see details in Box 
1), offers a cumulative analysis of cooperation strat-
egies and not an evolution of the actors’ partner-
ships analyzed through a project-based approach 
(for a project-based approach of smart grid actors, 
see Ref. [15]). Our network analysis is an actor-
based approach, which focuses on partnership in-
tensity over time and throughout projects. For each 
actor, the graphic representations offer a cumula-
tive view of past and ongoing projects at a specific 
moment (here, May 2013). 
the Internet were reviewed). This excludes, for example, Chinese 
or Russian projects, which would only be registered in a non-
Latin alphabet. 
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3.2. Qualitative data methodology: semi-struc-
tured interviews 
From September 2012 to April 2013, a campaign of 
semi-structured interviews was performed with 
stakeholders from the French smart grid sector (see 
Table 2). The qualitative methodology consists of 
addressing thematic issues, which are pre-identified 
and listed in an interview grid, but following the 
conversation’s natural flow. During these interviews 
aimed at investigating the smart grid actors’ percep-
tion of the sector, the issues discussed dealt with 
smart grid perimeter and definitions, R&D project 
goals, regulation context, impact of political initia-
tives, identified and expected added values, busi-
ness models and value distribution, efficiency of de-
mand-response programs and strategic positioning. 
27 recorded and transcribed interviews (with 37 
persons) were all performed both by a sociologist 
and an economist. The interviews, lasting on aver-
age 1 h 30 min (with an amplitude from38 min to 3 
h 16 min), were thematically analyzed. This means 
that the two researchers who conducted the inter-
views first read the transcripts separately to identify 
salient elements and then confronted their the-
matic analysis results to build a common data inter-
pretation ensuring the reliability of the study. This 
reliability was tested by presenting the research re-
sults (both qualitative and quantitative) to the inter-
viewed actors during a restitution meeting.  
 
Table 2  
Distribution of people interviewed by organizational cate-
gory 
Typology of organization Number of peo-
ple interviewed 
Aggregator  2 
Consultancy  1 
DSO (Distribution System Operator)  3 
Energy company  3 
Energy lobby  2 
Local public authority  3 
Manufacturer  5 
Public authority  6 
Research institute  3 
Service provider  5 
TSO (transmission system operator)  1 
University  3 
Total  37 
 
The decision to quote interview transcripts in an 
anonymous way, without even mentioning organi-
zational affiliation or geographical location, was 
made because the French smart grid ecosystem at 
the time was too small and in some regards too sin-
gular to avoid any identification. Nonetheless, to 
ensure that quotations made in the paper are rep-
resentative of the whole range of interviewed ac-
tors, we numbered the transcripts to contextualize 
the quotations. To address editing length con-
straints, we only used one quotation source at a 
time in this paper, but it is noticeable that all the 
referenced arguments were mentioned by several 
actors (for detailed results, see Ref. [49]). 
 
4. Results and analysis 
This section presents the analytical results strength-
ened by confronting both qualitative and quantita-
tive data. 
 
4.1. Network analysis 
4.1.1. The network of worldwide cooperation in the 
smart grid sector 
Our worldwide social network highlights the scat-
tering and cooperation weakness of smart grid ac-
tors, as illustrated on the cooperation map below 
(see Graph 1). On this graph, each node represents 
one of the 1598 actors involved in one or several of 
the 399 projects listed in our database. It is immedi-
ately visible that the network, composed of numer-
ous nodes, is concentric, which is reinforced by its 
low centrality indicator (2.6%)3.The principal com-
ponent (the biggest subnetwork) gathers 1501ac-
tors, i.e., 94% of the worldwide actors in the sector. 
The other 22components are very small (maximum 
10 nodes). Density (number of existing ties com-
pared to the theoretical maximum number of ties) 
is quite low (1.8%), which means that actors are not 
highly connected to one another. This network, with 
low centrality and low density but whose principal 
component gathers 94% of the nodes, is thus char-
acterized by weak and quite thinly stretched rela-
tionships: most of the nodes are weakly related, 
meaning that the worldwide smart grid sector is not 
highly integrated regarding cooperation strategies.  
 
                                                          
3 A star network is characterized by a 100-centrality degree, 
whereas a circle network corresponds to 0. 
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Graph 1. Worldwide partnership in smart grid projects. 
Caption: Geographic location of actors’ activities. 
Middle East, Africa, North America, Asia, Oceania, Europe, World. 
For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article. 
 
An in-depth analysis of actors’ geographical location 
(nodes’ color and shape in Graph 1) reveals the 
weak presence of African and Oceanian actors. 
Asian and Middle Eastern actors are much more vis-
ible, but nonetheless represent fewer than actors 
North America and Europe. The latter represent 
1082 of the 1598 inventoried actors (approximately 
68%). Even if North America and Europe’s predomi-
nance for locating smart grid projects could be over-
estimated (because our database surely underesti-
mates projects data inventoried in non-Latin alpha-
bets), the consolidated Open EI database confirms 
this trend (see http://en.openei.org/ [consulted 
May 2014]). 
Actors involved in projects located in only one geo-
graphic area (i.e., 309 actors in North America, 56 in 
Asia, 49 in the Middle East,16 in Oceania and 3 in 
Africa) are not very active at the worldwide network 
scale. In Graph 1, these actors are distributed on pe-
ripheral circles, depending on their relationship de-
gree with central actors. Even some actors on outer 
areas (from North America, Africa and Europe) are 
no more connected to the main cooperation net-
work. It should be noted that here, activity does not 
refer to the capacity of projects or actors to produce 
results, but to activity in cooperation relationships. 
Obviously, an actor can have little activity regarding 
cooperation (having only one partner or a single 
project) but can be very effective for R&D results. 
Cooperation activity only conveys he position in the 
sector: it is not a quality indicator.  
The massive presence of North American and Euro-
pean actors observed on the worldwide smart grid 
network corroborates actors’ discourse on the ex-
istence of converging dynamics at work in some ar-
eas to strongly promote smart grid development. 
Indeed, whatever the specific causes for smart grid 
implementation (aging grids in the USA and the in-
tegration of renewable energy in Europe), actors 
have related them all to the inability of the industry 
sector, destabilized by the current crisis context, to 
afford the costs of a deficient energy supply and an 
increase in energy prices. Obviously, the two areas 
most concerned by these issues are North America 
and Europe: 
“To revive economy, reliable infrastructures are 
required as well as cheap energy. These are the 
keys for a competitive industry. And the [smart 
grid] objective is precisely to revitalize industry. 
In the US, the problem is about having a quality 
and continuous supply. It is very expensive to 
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produce if energy is not regularly supplied. For 
electrosensitive activities, like the paper indus-
try, when a default in the energy supply occurs, 
you lose your entire production line, which is un-
affordable and unacceptable for the indus-
try.”4#35 
Politicians have answered this issue by implement-
ing investment policies in grid infrastructures and in 
economic revival. These policies first took place in 
the USA (Energy Policy Act 2005, American Recov-
ery and Reinvestment Act 2009): 
“With his [investment roadmap in smart grid], 
he [President Obama] has wanted to revive in-
dustry, first for the grid’s equipment industry, 
and then as a consequence for all industrial ac-
tivities, expecting, of course, job creation. For 
him, smart grid should be used as a spearhead 
for revitalizing the national economy, a kind of 
communication term but based on economic is-
sues.” #26 
In addition, Europe—mainly the European Union 
[50]—has adopted and followed the US strategy to 
maintain the European industry’s competitiveness: 
“As in Europe, the crisis also impacted industry. 
The decision was made to do the same [as the 
USA]. That is why massive funding has been 
spent on [smart grid] projects. In the2009–2010 
period, research and demonstration projects for 
smart grid deployment were launched with pre-
market tests to help European industrialists face 
the US ones.” #11 
It is thus obvious that public authorities have been 
playing an important part in the smart grid imple-
mentation, mainly motivated by the worldwide con-
text of reinforced competition between national in-
dustries. This competitive environment between 
Europe and North America has been identified as 
crucial in the actors’ discourses, which is clearly vis-
ible in Graph 1, considering the nodes’ separated 
distribution. 
 
4.1.2. Network typology of actors: observers and/or 
experimenters 
An in-depth network statistical analysis of our data-
base highlights the importance of taking into ac-
count for each actor, on the one hand, the number 
                                                          
4 Indented text blocks are quotations from semi-structured inter-
views with French smart grid actors. The reference numbers are 
of partnerships and, on the other hand, the relation-
ship intensity. 
Concerning the number of partnerships, network 
analysis allowed us to identify the most connected 
actors of the network (between 31 and 573 part-
ners), visible in the center of Graph 1. In compari-
son, 31 is the average number of partners in the 
overall sample and accounts for 75% of actors 
above, which allows us to say that they are very ac-
tive in the network. These actors are all involved in 
worldwide or European cooperation projects.  
Considering relationship intensity, it appears that 
cooperation is also dependent on relationship per-
manence, visible in the links intensity. That is why 
we characterized each actor with the indicator of 
centrality degree, integrating both number of part-
ners and links intensity (see section Node attrib-
utes).  
Using these network indicators to sort the actors, a 
typology emerged distinguishing four distinct 
groups. Then, to characterize the actors from each 
network analysis category, we had to develop a bet-
ter quantitative definition of the various partner-
ships. In this case, partnership had two compo-
nents: the number and the size of the projects in 
which an actor is involved. The hypothesis is that co-
operating with many partners in a few large projects 
reveals a different relationship and thus a different 
positioning strategy than having many partners par-
ticipating in many large projects.  
A quartile analysis showed that 75% of actors were 
involved in between 1 and 2 projects and the re-
maining 25% participated in more than 2 projects 
(up to 43). In this context, being involved in more 
than 2 projects is considered having many projects. 
To distinguish actors involved in large projects from 
those involved in small projects, we first calculated 
an average project size for each actor (i.e., for each 
actor, the total number of partners was divided by 
the total number of projects). Then, based on a 
quartile analysis, we identified markers to delimit 
categories in terms of the size of an average project, 
the result being that actors are involved in small 
projects when their average project size is between 
1 and 7partners, in medium projects when the size 
is between 8 and 12, in large projects when it is be-
tween 13 and 21, and in huge projects when it is be-
tween 22 and 90. 
used to distinguish the source of the quotations used in the pa-
per. 
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We then compared the four categories of actors ob-
tained with network analysis using these elements 
of characterization (see Table 3) to better 
understand the actors’ positioning strategy and to 
characterize them.  
Table 3 
Categories of actors in worldwide network typology. 
Network typology (%)  Average number of 
projects 
Corresponding cate-
gory of projects num-
ber 
Average number of 
partners 
Corresponding cate-
gory of average pro-
ject size 
Local observers 
(48.2%)  
1.2  Few projects (<2) 7  Small (between 1 and 
7) 
Global observers 
(44.1%)  
1.5  Few projects (<2) 46  Huge (above 22) 
Experimenters (6.3%)  5.6  Many projects (>2) 11.7  Medium (between 8 
and 13) 
Central actors (1.4%)  17.8  Many projects (>2) 12.7  Medium (between 8 
and 13) 
 
Local observers (771 actors, 48.2%) are involved in 
a few projects (between 1 and 3, on average 1.2), 
quite small (from 1 to 12 partners, on average 7) 
and located in a single geographical area. 64.7%are 
Europeans, 28.2% North Americans, 3% Asians, 1% 
Oceanians, and 0.4% Africans. Only 2.7% are world-
wide actors. Thus, local observers are mainly na-
tional actors, initiating their positioning on the 
smart grid sector by getting involved in a few prac-
tical projects with local partners.  
Global observers (704 actors, 44.1%) are quite central 
in the worldwide network because they participate in 
huge projects (22 partners and more, on average 46). 
However, the number of projects they are involved in 
remains small (on average 1.5). Consequently, these 
actors have a cooperation network of low intensity, 
even if they have a dense network of partnerships, 
focused on a single geographical area. 70.7% are Eu-
ropeans, 11.9% North Americans,7% from the Middle 
East, 4.7% Asians, and 1.1% Oceanians. None are Af-
ricans, and only 4.5% are worldwide actors. Global 
observers are mainly continental actors, whose core 
activities are connected to the smart grid sector. 
They are interested in the smart grid sector to even-
tually initiate their positioning strategy.  
Experimenters (101 actors, 6.3%) are involved in 
many projects (between 4 and 10, on average 5.6) 
of medium size (on average 11.7partners). This sug-
gests that these are applied projects. Most are Eu-
ropeans (75.2%), 16.8% are worldwide, and 7.9% 
                                                          
5 We use the “central actors” term that is richer than “nodal ac-
tors” because these actors are both central and nodal. The cen-
trality in network analysis (see Box 1) measures the impact of 
each actor on the network overall activity, taking into account 
are North Americans. Experimenters are narrowly 
related to the sector of energy and smart grid, mul-
tiplying participation in applied projects.  
Finally, central actors5 (22 actors, 1.4%, listed in Ta-
ble 3) are characterized by a large amount of pro-
jects (between 11 and43 projects, on average 17.8), 
whereas the size of those projects remains medium 
(12.7 partners per project). In addition, the differ-
ence in size between the various projects is rather 
important (from3 to 90 partners). 13 are worldwide 
actors (59.1%), and 9 are active only in Europe 
(40.9%). The central actors combine the strategies 
of both experimenters and observers because they 
are simultaneously involved both in quite small and 
applied projects with well-identified partners and in 
large-scaled worldwide projects, allowing them to 
monitor R&D trends within the smart grid sector. 
Hence, these actors are central in the worldwide 
network, as they have numerous partners as well as 
close cooperation relationships.  
In Graph 2, which relies on the same data as Graph 
1 but focuses on partnerships with more than 3 co-
operation links, we applied the network typology 
(see caption), which improves the understanding of 
actors’ positioning and thus highlights the smart 
grid sector’s functioning. Indeed, the choice to re-
duce the worldwide network to partnerships with 
more than 3 cooperation links highly simplifies the 
graph.  
relationship intensity. The nodality measures the intermediary 
position of key actors. Central actors are gathering both charac-
teristics. 
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Graph 2. Network typology applied to worldwide intense partnership. 
Caption: Geographical scales (shapes): World/  Europe. 
Network typology (colors): Experimenters/  Local observers/  Global observers/  Central actors 
Note 1: Only partnerships with more than 3 cooperation links are represented here. The actor’s name is available for those with 
4 cooperation links or more. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the 
web version of this article.) 
Note 2: TU stands for “Technological University” and U for “University”. 
Note 3: For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article. 
 
Indeed, it excludes the local observers from the 
graphic representation, which is coherent with the 
category definition, i.e., actors involved in very few 
(less than 2 projects) projects. This new version of the 
worldwide smart grid network clearly illustrates how 
central actors are both related to experimenters and 
to global observers as they are involved both in local 
projects and in huge projects aiming at monitoring 
the smart grid technological trends. It validates that 
the network typology based on the statistical analysis 
of our database is coherent with the reality of net-
work organization. Moreover, it is visible that central 
actors are not necessarily the nodes with the biggest 
centrality degree (seeable in node size). Finally, one 
can observe some proximity between the more ac-
tive global observers, for example in the top right-
hand corner or in the bottom left-hand corner. It is 
explained by their belonging to few huge projects.  
In Table 4, the 22 central actors from our network ty-
pology are indexed according to the actors’ typology 
commonly used in literature (mostly based on the 
analysis of the European area, see Ref. [4, 13, 48]). 
These actors’ typologies usually propose three cate-
gories: (1) energy utility suppliers (i.e., energy 
suppliers and operators on transmission and distribu-
tion systems), (2) smart grid technology suppliers 
(i.e., suppliers of infrastructure for energy transmis-
sion and distribution, metering equipment suppliers 
and ICT firms), and (3) research institutes (i.e., univer-
sities and research centers).  
The 22 actors identified as central in cooperation net-
work belong to one of these 3 categories: no new 
type of actor has emerged from network analysis. 
What network analysis has added to the actors’ ty-
pology is that, at the moment of our study, first, most 
of the central actors (excepting research institutes) 
belong to the energy sector, and second, ICT firms 
belong to the local or global observers categories 
and, consequently, are not dominant at the world-
wide scale, whereas they are quite numerous to be 
involved in the sector. Indeed, only one, IBM, is iden-
tified as a worldwide central actor for the smart grid 
sector.  
The network typology also matches with qualitative 
data. Indeed, the French actors’ discourse also states 
that smart grid currently is mostly structured by elec-
trical grids, even if some pilot sites are also 
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experimenting with gas and water. As electricity is a 
non-storable utility, the issue of closely adjusting de-
mand to supply to avoid losses is recurrent because 
electrical grids exist:  
“What I can say is that smart grids, in electrical 
grids, are not new. In fact, it is more a natural evo-
lution of technology applied to electrical grids. 
Electrical grids have always been “smart”, from 
their very beginning. Indeed, the original idea to 
count with meters, whereas first, people were 
paying a flat fee… it was quite a start for smart 
grid. If smart grid is now at stake, it is because cur-
rent technological progress allows us to imple-
ment ideas that were already in mind 20 or even 
30 years ago. […] The idea to use meters as grid 
sensors and to use meters to manage the with-
drawal of end users’ demand withdrawal has ex-
isted for ages.” #37  
Table 4  
Categorization of the 22 worldwide central actors.  
Actors  Typology of organization (literature catego-
rization) 
ABB Supplier of transmission and distribution in-
frastructure (2)  
AIT  University/research center (3) 
Alstom  Supplier of transmission and distribution in-
frastructure (2) 
Danfoss energy  Supplier of transmission and distribution in-
frastructure (2) 
Dong energy  Energy supplier (1) 
EDF  Energy supplier (1) 
Enel  Energy supplier (1) 
ERDF  Distribution system operator (1) 
General electric  Supplier of transmission and distribution in-
frastructure (2) 
Iberdrola  Energy supplier (1) 
IBM  ICT (2) 
Kema  Consultant specializing in energy (3) 
Landis + Gyr  Metering equipment supplier (2) 
REE  Transmission system operator (1) 
RTE  Transmission system operator (1) 
RWE  Energy supplier (1) 
Schneider electric  Supplier of transmission and distribution in-
frastructure (2) 
Siemens  Supplier of transmission and distribution in-
frastructure (2) 
TU Denmark  University/research center (3) 
TU Wien  University/research center (3) 
U Aalborg  University/research center (3) 
Vattenfall  Energy supplier (1) 
Note: TU stands for “Technological University” and U for “Univer-
sity”. 
                                                          
6 Austrian Climate & Energy Fund: Hit with 6 partners, Smart Web 
Grid with 6partners, V2G Strategies with 6 partners, V2G Inter-
faces with 6 partners, Consumer to Grid (C2G) with 5 partners, 
DG Demonet Smart Low Voltage Grid with 6 partners, DG De-
monet Validierung with 6 partners, Smart Synergy with 6 part-
ners and B2Gwith 4 partners. 
The specificity of electricity and thus of electrical 
grids is probably the main reason for enthusiastically 
adopting smart grid in this sector first. Network anal-
ysis also shows secondary networks, which gather 
partners (only central actors and experimenters) who 
are especially used to working together, visible on 
Graph 2. One of the most important networks in-
volves AIT and TU Wien, having 12and 9 cooperation 
links with Siemens, respectively, both having 8 with 
Salzburg Wohnbaus, and having 11 with one another. 
Thus a strong secondary network has emerged (as 
each actor has a rather high connectivity degree alto-
gether, which means that each actor is connected to 
several partners belonging to this particular second-
ary network) between 6 actors (Siemens, Salzburg 
Wohnbaus, Fichtner It Consulting, TU Wien, Salzburg 
AG and AIT) structured by 9 projects6 with 5.6 part-
ners on average, all cofunded as part of the Austrian 
Climate & Energy Fund. Another example is the sec-
ondary network between EDF, Alstom, RTE, ERDF, Ar-
mines and Schneider Electric mainly structured by 
127 projects co-funded by the EU, ADEME (French 
Agency for Environment and Energy Control) and the 
Mediterranean solar plan of the Union for the Medi-
terranean (MSP-UfM). These projects include 15 
partners on average. This first analysis highlights a 
type of backbone for cooperation by making the 
most robust and structuring relationships for the 
worldwide smart grid sector visible. It also shows that 
projects’ superposition designates some key funders 
with strong impacts on sector evolutions. This con-
firms previous results according to which public ad-
ministrations and politicians have been playing a key 
role in smart grid development, mainly through R&D 
programs and innovation policies [36, 38, 43, 50]. 
 
4.1.3. Smart grid development in France 
In this section, our French database (with 354 actors 
involved in 70 French projects or having a French pi-
lot site) is exploited using the network typology built 
at the worldwide scale. It allows us to study the spec-
ificities of French actors’ relationships and their im-
pact on the smart grid sector (see Graph 3). It is clear 
that the French cooperation network is slightly differ-
ent from the worldwide cooperation network, as its 
centrality degree is lower (9.1%), with sub-networks 
7 European Union: Grid4EU with 25 partners, Twenties with 26 
partners, SmartLife with 8 partners and Safewind with 21 part-
ners; ADEME: Smart Electric Lyon with 18 partners, Venteea with 
10 partners, Nice Grid with 13 partners, Postes Intelligents with 
3 partners, Smart Grid Vendée with 8 partners, and Premio with 
15partners; MSP-UfM: MedGrid with 21 partners and Trans-
Green with 13 partners. 
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less dependent on actors located at the center (i.e., 
having the largest number of partners). The main 
component of the French network gathers 342 actors 
(i.e., 96.6% of the network), whereas the other 4 
components gather only 4 nodes each. Network den-
sity is comparable to the worldwide network: 24% 
(i.e.,86 of 354 actors) have 2 links or more, whereas 
we have 28% for the worldwide scale. 
 
Graph 3. Network typology of French partnerships. 
Caption: Geographical scales (shapes): France/  France & Europe/  Europe. 
Network typology (colors):  Experimenters/  Local observers/  Global observers/  Central actor. 
Note 1: The “France” scale concerns actors involved in projects only deployed in France, whereas the “France & Europe”scale 
characterizes actors involved in French and European projects (with pilot sites in another European country). 
Note 2: For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article. 
To adapt the network typology to the smaller scale of 
the French sector (lower number of projects and part-
ners), we marginally modified the statistical charac-
teristics of each category of actors(see Table 5): here, 
having many projects means having more than1 
project and the thresholds in terms of project size are 
1, 8, 12, 21and 42 partners (previously 1, 7, 12, 21 and 
90). However, despite these marginal modifications, it 
appears that the network typology remains pertinent 
and operational at the French scale.  
 
Table 5  
French actors’ categories of network typology. 
Typology  Analytical scale (% of the 
sample) 
Average number of projects 
and corresponding category 
of project number 
Average number of partners 
and corresponding project 
size 
Local observers  World (48.2%)  
France (46.9%)  
1.2 
1 
Few 
7 
8.6 
Small 
Global observers  World (44.1%)  
France (38.1%) 
1.5 
1.4 
Few 
46 
24.9 
Huge 
Experimenters  World (6.3%)  
France (12.7%) 
5.6 
2.8 
A lot 
11.7 
9.9 
Medium 
Central actors  World (1.4%)  
France (1.3%) 
17.8 
10.4 
A lot 
12.7 
11.8 
Medium 
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An in-depth analysis of Table 5 shows that experiment-
ers in France are significantly more numerous than at 
the worldwide scale, even if they are involved in fewer 
projects. This indicates that applied projects are flour-
ishing in France, probably as a result of public pro-
grams implemented with ADEME’s specific funds.  
Comparing French and worldwide databases (Graph 2, 
Graph 4) shows that some worldwide central actors 
simply disappeared at the French scale, such as Gen-
eral Electric, TU Denmark, Kema, TU Wien, U Aalborg, 
Atos Origin, Danfoss Energy and Dong Energy. Other 
worldwide central actors became global observers 
(Siemens, Iberdrola, Vattenfall, REE, RWE and Enel) or 
experimenters (IBM and Landis + Gyr) at the French 
scale. Only EDF, ERDF, RTE, Schneider Electric and Al-
stom remained central both worldwide and at the 
French scale. On the contrary, some actors have ex-
tended the scope of their activities: Armines, CEA and 
GDF-Suez are central actors within the French smart 
grid sector, whereas they are experimenters at the 
worldwide scale.  
The French cooperation network is obviously struc-
tured around a backbone of secondary networks  
visible on Graph 4, as observed at the worldwide scale. 
Indeed, EDF and Armines cooperated 7 times. EDF 
worked 6 times with ERDF, 5 times with Schneider 
Electric, Eneland Delta Dore, and 3 times with Alstom. 
ERDF became involved in 5 projects with Armines and 
RTE, 4 with Alstom and 3 with Schneider Electric. These 
cooperation relationships are organized approxi-
mately 12 projects, and8 (each involving at least 3 of 
these actors) were co-funded by the EU, ADEME, Oséo 
(French Agency for Innovation) and the Single Interde-
partmental Fund (Fonds Unique Interministériel, or 
FUI). 
Among the French central actors, EDF occupies a sin-
gular and dominant position, as it is the historical 
French energy producer. However, although it is the 
most active actor in the French smart grid sector (gath-
ering both the most numerous and most intense coop-
eration relationships), it is not central (according to the 
network analysis definition, i.e., it does not prevent re-
lationships between other actors) because coopera-
tion exists apart from EDF’s involvement. Indeed, EDF 
is not involved in 7 projects co-funded by ADEME and 
ANR (French Agency for Research). 
 
Graph 4. Network typology of French intense partnerships. 
Caption: Scale (shapes): France/  France & Europe/  Europe. 
Typology (colors):  Experimenters/  Local observers/  Global observers/  Central actors 
Note 1: Only partnerships with 2 cooperation links or more are represented here. 
                                                          
8 European Union: Grid4EU with 25 partners and Green eMotion 
with 42 partners; ADEME: Smart Electric Lyon with 18 partners, 
Venteea with 10 partners, NiceGrid with 13 partners, Postes In-
telligents with 3 partners, Smart Grid Vendée with8 partners, 
Premio with 15 partners, GreenLys with 5 partners and Millener 
with 6 partners; Oséo: Homes with 13 partners; FUI: EcoLink with 
12 partners and Enerstock with 7 partners. 
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Note 2: TU stands for “Technological University” and U for “University”. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this 
figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.) 
Note 3: For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this 
article. 
 
Table 6. Categorization of the 8 French central actors. 
 
Actors Typology of organization (literature cate-
gorization) 
Alstom Supplier of transmission and distribution 
infrastructure (2) 
EDF Energy supplier (1) 
ERDF Distribution system operator (1) 
GDF Suez Energy supplier (1) 
RTE Transmission system operator (1) 
Schneider 
electric 
Supplier of transmission and distribution 
infrastructure (2) 
Armines University/research center (3) 
CEA University/research center (3) 
 
As previously performed, we categorized central ac-
tors according to the actors’ typology found in the 
literature (see Table 6). 
Once again, central actors, as defined by the net-
work typology, come mostly from the energy sector 
(excepting research institutes).Furthermore, the 
homogeneity of French central actors is higher than 
worldwide because no ICT firm belongs to the cen-
tral actors category, whereas, as previously stated, 
they are too numerous to become involved in the 
smart grid sector [19]. 
 
4.2. Actors’ strategies 
Using French actors’ interviews, this section aims at 
highlighting the perceptions of the smart grid sector 
and, of course, its uncertainty, hiding behind the ob-
served network positioning strategies identified 
with the network analysis. 
 
4.2.1. Energy sector and demand-oriented market 
In France, actors differentiate two smart grid sec-
ondary markets, one that is supply-oriented and the 
other, demand-oriented. The first one addresses 
updating and management of the grid’s infrastruc-
tures. It is governed by well-established energy 
companies, most of them being part of the list of the 
French central actors. Furthermore, the previous 
network analysis has shown that the8 and 15% of 
active actors (respectively worldwide and at French 
scale), i.e., experimenters and central actors, come 
from the energy sector.  
The energy sector domination is noted by French ac-
tors as being the reason for the high degree of 
uncertainty characterizing the smart grid sector. In-
deed, energy actors naturally follow a supply-ori-
ented logic: 
“What is changing is that now supply is limited 
because of the technical constraints of produc-
tion and grids. However, we [energy suppliers] 
are still under the logic where supply tries to 
adapt demand to what we can offer and not the 
other way around....” #6 
As this supply-oriented market requires huge in-
vestments, new entrants are rare and can only be 
direct foreign competitors, i.e., from the energy sec-
tor. 
Actors from the energy sector thus are not tradi-
tionally demand-oriented, even if they are currently 
modifying their approach. The prevalence of supply-
oriented logic is, according to French actors, a real 
problem for smart grid viability. Indeed, the two 
secondary markets are supposed to balance one an-
other to compensate for the smart grid cost/benefit 
analysis gap. To be more precise, the increasing in-
vestment costs in the supply-oriented market 
should be compensated for by the value created in 
the demand-oriented market. Hence, the emer-
gence of a global and steady business model for 
smart grid mostly depends on the ability of smart 
grid actors to evolve from a supply-oriented to a de-
mand-oriented market. However, as previously 
demonstrated in academics, in the smart grid sector 
the “incumbents of the focal sector”, i.e., energy, 
have low transformation capacity [19]. 
This is a great concern, especially as the demand-
oriented secondary market, which mainly addresses 
demand response management, has not yet clearly 
identified its clients. Indeed, as stated in the litera-
ture review, end users, until now, have not been 
very interested in smart grid projects, despite at-
tempts to create incentives, mainly using dynamic 
tariffs [22]. As it remains difficult to identify value 
sources, no business model has emerged: 
“Concerning demand–response management, 
no business model currently exists.” #21 
The positive way of considering the lack of smart 
grid demand is that, so far, everything still needs to 
be created.  
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4.2.2. Uncertainty or potentiality 
In an environment dominated by energy actors and 
their supply-oriented logic, it is difficult to change 
distribution on the smart grid value chain so that it 
may be beneficial to end users, at least partially. 
Consequently, some actors from other sectors are 
trying to enlarge the smart grid’s perimeter, beyond 
energy, to stimulate demand and depart from the 
supply-oriented logic: 
“According to me, smart grid is an optimization 
system of the consumption of a fluid resource, 
whatever it is.” #18“ 
For now, [smart grid] uses mostly electricity, but 
the grid is evolving more and more towards gas 
and heating grids or evenwater.” #33 
“Beyond the electrical grid is the Smart Home 
and even the Smart City. We are working, for ex-
ample, on dashboards to allow local authorities 
to monitor and control many uses far beyond 
energy: transportation, waste, water, electrical 
vehicle, health, the elderly, etc.” #29 
Based on this enlarged vision of smart grid, some 
French actors (and others abroad, see, for example, 
Ref. [1, 2, 4]) are currently testing end users’ ser-
vices, combining energy management with safety 
devices, air quality monitoring or home care for the 
elderly. From these actors’ point of view, which is 
generally unfamiliar to the energy sector, smart grid 
is indeed a very attractive market mainly because it 
has suddenly emerged, carrying new potential ex-
pectations. For firms settled in nearly saturated 
markets (for example, ICT), smart grid offers a cred-
ible alternative to ensure their growth and technical 
development. From this perspective, they want to 
be ready to jump into the market if ever it reveals 
its potential: 
“Everyone is waiting and everyone is cautious, 
but everyone is curious to see what will happen. 
It is a little like a street show, people are joining 
just to have a look. They are doing nothing, but 
they are not totally in a ‘wait and see’ posture. 
[…] However, people interested in business 
models are wondering: “what new actors will 
emerge? What markets will emerge? Do I have a 
space? When should I invest?” And it is like in a 
chess game: pragmatic vision, but unclear. Each 
and every one, we are all looking for a vision of 
potential markets. And there is no altarboy.” #37 
Even, some French actors argue that smart grid 
could be a type of market bubble, having doubts 
about its short-term viability: 
“These Ciscos, IBMs and others implemented 
huge projects. And they communicated a lot on 
them. And now the soufflè is collapsing.” #28“ 
I sincerely think that there is a kind of market 
bubble. One talks a lot about smart grid. . . at the 
beginning, our 100 partners imagined important 
market shares and a huge volume of business. 
However, they will be disappointed as they get a 
fifth or so…” #14 
If pragmatism allows new ideas, the unclear defini-
tion and perimeter of smart grid induces uncer-
tainty about the possible emergence of demand, 
which feeds actors’ caution, enclosing the smart 
grid sector into a vicious circle that is very difficult 
to break. 
This cautious positioning is also visible through the 
network analysis. Indeed, among the four types of 
actors, two of them—local and global observers—
reflect the “wait and see” position. What is surpris-
ing here is that these observers account for 92% of 
the worldwide smart grid actors and 85% of the 
French actors. In accordance with previous anal-
yses, these numerous observers, most of whom are 
established actors from another sector, should be 
more likely than central actors from the energy sec-
tor to transform the smart grid sector [19, 35]. 
However, so far, the transformative capacity of 
smart grid attributed to observers coming from 
other sectors has not emerged because this means 
offering a convincing vision, which does not exist 
yet. It also means commitment in local institutional 
structures and networks [28, 49]. Thus, the strongly 
structured cautious positioning observed in this pa-
per is handicapping the smart grid development, as 
it reveals the absence of willingness of observers 
from other sectors to invest massive resources in 
such networks. 
National administrations and politicians, whether 
aware or unaware of this reality, can play a crucial 
part here. Through projects funded in whole or in 
part by public money, a common and shared vision 
of smart grid could finally emerge. Indeed, these 
projects allowed for the creation of cooperation 
routines between regular partners, visible in the 
secondary cooperation networks. The possibility of 
experimenting with technical solutions together is 
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indeed a way to create convergence between differ-
ent visions of the sector: 
“Technically speaking, huge converging work 
has been launched for a few years with demon-
stration projects.” #17 
“Demonstration projects funded through the IA 
[“Investissement d’avenir”, i.e., specific French 
funding] are, from what I’ve been told, precisely 
aiming at assessing the cake’s size and the share 
each can get. Some partners really want to build 
a converging vision of the smart grid market to 
promote it among public authorities.” #21 
Hence, the issue of the viability of business model 
for the smart grid market could be solved by pro-
moting a common vision of smart grid shared by the 
actors among public authorities. As the smart grid 
value seems to be nested at the crossroads of sev-
eral secondary markets, French public authorities 
can be helpful to ease and, when necessary, to reg-
ulate discussions between competing actors. 
 
4.2.3. Embedded strategies 
The schematic distinction previously stated be-
tween observers and active actors has to be quali-
fied. Indeed, superposed dynamics are visible in the 
smart grid socio-technical system. For instance, we 
demonstrated that central actors were simultane-
ously implementing monitoring and experimenta-
tion strategies, i.e., a cumulative strategy. Further-
more, comparison between the worldwide and the 
French scale makes the various strategies imple-
mented by a single actor visible. For example, an ac-
tor seen as central worldwide, such as Siemens, be-
comes a global observer when considered on a 
smaller scale. It is thus empirically visible that actors 
have multilevel strategies, reinforcing the interest 
in studying the interactions between the actors’ mi-
crolevel and the socio-technical system’s meso-
level. Sometimes these strategies are cumulative 
(having several strategies at the same time), and 
sometimes they are differentiated (a strategy for a 
territory, another one elsewhere). 
Empirical data reveal three levels of cooperation in 
accordance with insights from innovation studies on 
cooperation strategies [11, 32, 58]. First, relation-
ships that are often exclusive have developed on an 
intra-company basis in a high-risk context regarding 
investment. In this case, enterprises chose joint 
venture or strategic alliances to share technology 
and even product creation. At this first level, 
considering smart grid relationships, we find coop-
eration between EDF and Veolia Environment 
through Dalkia or more recently Bouygues and Al-
stom through Embix (joint-venture dedicated to 
smart grid). Indeed, there is a de facto relational 
ecosystem associated with R&D projects as de-
scribed by actors: 
“We built an ecosystem with clients, technolog-
ical partners who complete our offer, but also 
partners who allow us to test, in other adjacent 
domains, our technical solution currently imple-
mented on electrical grid. For example, energy 
management in buildings, done with X: it is a 
partner; energy management in electric vehicles 
done with Y: it is a partner; and so on. […] We 
are trying to propose integrated solutions to cli-
ent. The ecosystem really eases project develop-
ment. […] On smart grid, itis not optimal to work 
‘in silos’ [in isolation], i.e., having all compe-
tences. It is better to interface with others.” #31 
Second, actors also develop relationships at inter-
company levels to coordinate several technologies. 
As previously observed in the cooperation network 
analysis, actors have built portfolios of partners 
(consortia, standardization lobby, etc.) to achieve 
technical agreements or standards: 
“We have a predefined architecture; we have 
standards we would like to reuse. That is why we 
took part in R&D projects and also in standardi-
zation committees at the European and US lev-
els, to promote these standards and to reuse 
them in our projects. Hence, [we have] always 
three principles: architecture and standards, 
and then an ecosystem.” #32 
Third, coordination can be implemented at the ex-
tra-company level to influence commercial environ-
ments and regulatory organizations through shared 
or converging political positions. In France, the 
“smart grids France” initiative embodies this multi-
level embedding of strategies. Indeed, it gathers 9 
competitive clusters (inter-company level) to frame 
a shared vision between members to influence sec-
torial evolution (extra-company level) and further 
cooperation in projects (intra-company level): 
“‘Smart grids France’ aims at raising awareness 
among enterprises and demonstration projects 
to standard-use cases. For example, if some-
thing has already been done elsewhere, can we 
reuse it and so on. The interest here is for indus-
trials. It is important that industrialists should, in 
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the end, be able to value this converging posi-
tion. It shapes the chain value. And technologi-
cally speaking, it is about lifting together some 
levers to spread technologies everyone can 
use.” #27 
However, competition is still real between actors. 
Indeed, field-work has taught us how difficult it re-
mains to access projects results, even when funded 
by public money. Indeed, in a moving and uncertain 
context, actors find it difficult to identify which 
piece of information is crucial or not to be competi-
tive in an emerging market. We are faced with sig-
nificant reluctance by actors to communicate on 
smart grid, mostly about R&D projects’ difficulties, 
lessons and results: 
“Elements for business models and R&D projects 
have to remain confidential in the company. In-
deed, we know they are false. If not, we would 
not need to develop a project to test them. They 
are more like hypotheses for provisional busi-
ness cases. And they evolve with the project’s 
results and then influence internal predictions. 
We will not talk about that.” #3 
Indeed, based on the original research project 
hosted in this study, we planned to study French 
case studies of demonstration projects. However, 
we did not manage to access data or results or even 
the technical information submitted to public fund-
ing agencies. We found that data access on strategic 
positioning or project content is strongly limited 
and sometimes forbidden. Thus, the case studies 
were abandoned. There are probably multiple rea-
sons for this, but after our fieldwork, two options 
appeared. First, the fact of not communicating on 
projects is a way to limit newcomers’ ability to learn 
about the smart grid sector and is thus a way to re-
strict possible competition. The purpose is to pro-
tect existing knowledge and dominating positions. 
Second, not communicating on projects is away to 
hide the fact that no tangible results have emerged. 
However, this restricted communication strategy is 
a real brake, once again, on the emergence of a 
shared and robust vision of smart grid and on the 
decrease of uncertainty regarding the sector [1, 5]. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This article argues that, whereas it is necessary to 
limit uncertainty and thus secure the sector’s devel-
opment and durability in the coming years, no struc-
turing and shared vision of smart grid has emerged 
among stakeholders. It empirically demonstrates 
that the cooperation network between smart grid 
actors reflects the progress of the emergence of 
such a shared vision, which is the very first step to 
reducing uncertainty. 
Based on an original methodology that combines 
qualitative and quantitative approaches, we first 
provide an overview of the worldwide cooperation 
network of smart grid actors. The social network 
analysis shows that actors are weakly related, 
meaning that the sector is not highly integrated in 
terms of cooperation strategies. It also allows us to 
identify four categories of actors regarding cooper-
ation strategies: local observers (onlookers in a few 
local projects), global observers (onlookers in a few 
international projects), local experimenters (active 
participants in several local projects with experi-
mental aspects), and central actors (multilevel ac-
tors actively involved in numerous projects with ex-
perimental aspects, both at local and international 
levels). This analytical typology highlights that 
worldwide smart grid is organized around a few ac-
tive actors—experimenters and central actors are 
7.7% of the worldwide stock smart grid actors—
which are observed by a huge amount of passive 
ones—local and global observers are the remaining 
92.3%of actors. 
Second, we show that the analytical distinction be-
tween the four categories deduced from the net-
work analysis reveals positioning strategies, each 
associated to one specific category of actors. On the 
one hand, experimenters and especially central ac-
tors appeared to be long-established actors in the 
field of energy. The analysis of semi-structured in-
terviews with French actors indicates that energy 
actors are promoting a very accurate vision, but it is 
strictly energy-oriented for the sector, i.e., supply-
oriented. On the other hand, global and local ob-
servers are mostly new entrants, recently born or 
coming from connected sectors. In interviews, they 
are depicted as offering a demand-oriented ap-
proach. Thus, they seem to be open to many op-
tions for further developments, but until now they 
have only given an indistinct definition of what 
smart grid could be. Therefore, actors diverge on 
the definition, perimeter and potential source of 
added value in smart grid. Furthermore, the actors’ 
discourse oscillates between enthusiasm, leaning 
against a voluntary positioning strategy, and reluc-
tance regarding reality and potentialities of smart 
grid embodied by a cautious positioning. 
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However, these two “active” and “passive” strate-
gies can be implemented at the same time: in a 
highly uncertain context, taking a resolute position 
prevents competitors from winning market shares, 
whereas a cautious strategy prevents them from 
risking massive investments. During our fieldwork, 
we also experienced that, in this context of tough-
ened competition, smart grid actors are—at least in 
France—very reluctant to share results and ideas. 
Hence, they are unable to build a shared and struc-
tured vision of smart grid that they could promote 
to public authorities to influence orientations con-
cerning R&D funding, regulation or economic poli-
cies. By doing so, they would be able to reduce un-
certainty in the sector, thus allowing potential pro-
spective achievements. 
From a theoretical point of view, these results based 
on the smart grid sector analysis allow us to propose 
new insights on the transition of socio-technical sys-
tems. Indeed, the situation observed in this case 
through networking cooperation strategies ques-
tions the validity of analyses showing that the ac-
tors’ potential for transition enhancement would be 
higher in connected sectors than in the focal sector 
[19, 35]. At this very moment where contextual un-
certainty remains high, it appears that active ac-
tors—here, coming from the focal sector of en-
ergy—play a crucial part in driving the current sec-
tor development, whereas new entrants—mainly 
from the connected ICT sector—remain unable to 
decisively modify the smart grid sector’s regime. It 
appears that success of the evolution of socio-tech-
nical system depends not only on actors’ sectoral ty-
pology or origin [19, 27, 35] but also on cooperation 
strategy, which is perceived as a powerful tool to 
foster the emergence of a shared vision among ac-
tors [5]. One can interpret this situation as a sign for 
the failure of the smart grid sector to emerge as 
such. On the other hand, one can see here a strate-
gic evolution of actors from the focal sector regard-
ing uncertainty in an innovative socio-technical sys-
tem in transition. To solve this issue, further studies 
should be conducted both on the smart grid sector 
to see how it will evolve and on other sectors to 
search for potential similar trends. 
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